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Kashmir Militancy After 370: 




India’s peaceful abrogation of Article 370 was a major geopolitical setback 
and an intelligence failure for Pakistan. In one stroke, India severely 
dented Pakistan’s complex and layered infrastructure of militancy. 
Contrary to expectations when there was no widespread backlash against 
it, the ISI-masterminds pressurised the local terrorist organisations and 
Islamist groups to execute a large-scale terror attack or orchestrate a 
massive civil uprising. However, when they failed, clueless and perplexed 
Pakistan made drastic strategic and tactical changes in running 
Kashmir’s militancy to gain its lost ground. The most significant change 
was to minimise the role of local terrorist groups like Hizbul Mujahidin 
(HM) and strengthen the foreign terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Al Badr as the leading groups. 
While to elude the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) scrutiny, many 
front organisations were created such as the LeT-led The Resistance Front 
(TRF) that emerged as the most active offshoot, claiming most terror 
attacks after 370. Another significant development is the emergence of 
Turkey as a critical stakeholder in Kashmir’s conflict theatre- working 
on multiple fronts ranging from militancy, diplomacy to inciting civil 
unrest. Given this context, the paper discusses and critically analyses the 
strategic and tactical changes ushered in by Pakistan in Kashmir’s proxy 
war after the abrogation of Article 370.1 
Mr. Abhinav Pandya, MPA from Cornell University, is the founder-CEO of Usanas Foundation, 
India. 
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Introduction
On 25 May 2020, Islamabad’s (Pakistan) Deputy Commissioner’s Twitter 
handle informed of a cylinder blast in an abandoned car in the street at 
G-10/2, in Islamabad.2 Reportedly, the residence of Syed Salahuddin, 
‘designated global terrorist’ (by the US State Department),3 supreme 
commander of Kashmir’s banned terrorist group Hizbul Mujahideen 
and also the chief of the United Jihad Council (UJC), an ISI-controlled 
umbrella organisation for all militant groups in Kashmir, which manages 
the nuts and bolts of militancy and separatism in India-administered 
Kashmir. 
The author’s informed interlocutors in Kashmir and Indian 
intelligence agencies confirmed that the ISI orchestrated the attack to 
threaten Salahuddin, of dire consequences if he did not refrain from 
publicly damning ISI in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).4 However, 
due to Pakistan’s tightly controlled media, the event more or less escaped 
the global counter-terrorism analysts’ critical scrutiny. 
A closer analysis signals towards alarming strategic and tactical 
changes in Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir. After India abrogated 
Kashmir’s quasi-autonomous status on August 2019, Pakistan has been 
giving a big push to Kashmir’s militancy. However, in the new strategy, 
the role and relevance of the local terrorist groups like HM stand 
diminished. In the post-370 militancy scenario, the foreign terrorist 
groups, primarily ISI’s core assets, such as JeM and LeT, have emerged as 
the most powerful actors in Kashmir, mar inalising the local groups such 
as the HM. Furthermore, global state and non-state jihadist actors such 
as Turkey, Iran, and the Taliban are emerging as critical players in shaping 
the contours of Kashmir’s terrorism. This brings into perspective the 
changing dynamics of the Kashmir conflict and in light of this, the paper 
seeks to discuss and critically analyse the strategic and tactical changes 
ushered in by Pakistan in Kashmir’s proxy war after the abrogation of 
Article 370. 












Abrogation of Kashmir’s Special Status—A Shocker to 
Pakistan
Over the last three decades of militancy, Pakistan established a robust 
constituency in Kashmir, rooted in a network of its proxy terrorist groups 
(both local and foreign) and their Over Ground Worker (OGW) network, 
separatist Hurriyat, radical Islamist organisations like Jamaat-i-Islami, 
Hawala operators, Human rights activists, mainstream politicians, media 
and the charity organisations.5 This well-knit and internally cohesive 
constituency has also enabled Pakistan to build, sustain and develop its 
highly complex and sophisticated intelligence network with an intense 
penetration in the state administration and intelligence agencies. Such 
a complex and layered intelligence set-up provided ISI with timely 
inputs on the existing and emerging social, political, and security-related 
developments. 
However, in August 2019, its ‘deep-state’ failed when India shocked 
Pakistan by abrogating Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which gave 
a semi-autonomous status to Kashmir.6 India’s Kashmir move was not 
only a massive intelligence failure but also a significant blow to ISI’s terror 
juggernaut in Kashmir, which it had built systematically and strategically 
over the last three decades. Contrary to Islamabad’s expectations, there 
was no popular revolt and social unrest. Except for a few minor incidents 
of protests and civilian deaths, the Kashmir valley remained peaceful and 
cooperative in implementing the abrogation decision on the ground. 
Reasons for the Peace after August 2019
After the encounter-death of a celebrity militant Zakir Musa of Ansar 
Ghazwat-ul-Hind, Al Qaeda’s local affiliate, fatigue was setting in among 
the local militants. The ordinary people in the valley had long become 
weary of conflict.7 Besides, they also showed symptoms of massive 
disillusionment and even hatred for Pakistan—realising that Pakistan was 
shedding the blood of local youth for its geopolitical interests. 
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In this perspective the factors that called for peace after 5 August are 
primarily two-fold: First, to note, in the five years that preceded Delhi’s 
historic decision, Indian security forces had launched an aggressive drive 
against militancy and killed a record number of militants, the majority 
of whom were untrained locals, primarily motivated by religious factors 
rather than the secular separatist ideology.8 On the other hand, Pakistan 
was content with the growing number of locals joining militancy and 
getting killed in encounters, in turn aggravating the hatred for India, 
which it thought was strengthening its own constituency. It was also 
economically cheaper and less risky as due to enhanced border vigilance 
and barbed-wire fencing, infiltrating terrorists from PoK had become a 
challenging task. However, Pakistan failed to perceive that along with 
the growing hatred for India’s security forces, its own sleazy game was 
getting exposed to the local populace- making a significant dent in the 
Pro-Pakistan narrative. 
Second, along with India’s kinetic approach against militancy, its 
systematic and organised crackdown on the terror-financing network 
and radical Islamist organisations also ruptured militancy’s infrastructure. 
In this domain, in particular, certain measures such as ban on the Line 
of Control (LoC) trade, reportedly one of the major sources of terror 
financing employed for smuggling cash, narcotics, and weapons, in the 
valley, National Investigation Agency’s (NIA) offensive against Hawala 
operators and separa ist leadership, and the Ministry of Home Affairs’ 
(MHA) ban on Jamaat-i-Islami, the central feeder organisation to terrorist 
groups, acted effectively. All these measures were immensely helpful in 
maintaining peace for almost a year-and-a-half in Kashmir after repealing 
its special status. As noted, in the period 2018-2020, there was a decline 
in the number of terrorist incidents (5 per cent) and sponsored stone-
pelting protests (75 per cent), which has been the most critical law and 
order challenge since the 2008 Amarnath row agitation.9












What Prompted the Change in Strategy and Tactics?
The long and disturbing silence following Delhi’s Kashmir move was 
indeed a puzzle for intelligence and security affairs analysts in Delhi and 
Srinagar. However, for Pakistan, it was turning into a nightmare. Prime 
Minister Imran Khan’s attempts to rally the global diplomatic community 
against India on Delhi’s ‘5 August’ decision ended in a disaster. The 
majority of the Arab nations and the western world supported India, 
and Pakistan was left with allies like Turkey, questionable for its secret 
ties with terrorist groups, and to some extent, Malaysia. Having failed in 
global diplomatic outreach, Pakistan intensified ceasefire violations after 
the abrogation, to get global attention. As noted, the number of ceasefire 
violations increased from 1629 (2018), 3168 (2019) to 2027 (until 10 
June 2020).10
Despite its well-planned motivation props such as global propaganda 
in the UN bodies and continuous ceasefire violations on the border with 
India, its proxies failed to galvanise the people into public revolt or even 
execute a large-scale terror attack. The ISI masterminds felt that Kashmir 
might slip out of Pakistan’s grip, which means a geopolitical catastrophe. 
Kashmir is a jugular vein of the Pak army-quintessential to justify its 
disproportionate share of the budget and overweening control over the 
polity, economy, and society.11 Further, Kashmir is also a potent symbol in 
popular perception- giving the Islamic republic’s collective consciousness 
a much-needed threa  to unite in an overall socio-political milieu marred 
by threatening fault-lines in the form of sectarian rifts and separatist 
insurgencies. On the Indian side, Indian political leaders12 were raising 
the pitch on PoK,13 in parliamentary debates on Article 370, maybe for 
entirely domestic gains; however, it led to growing suspicions and fears 
about a potential Indian offensive into PoK. 
Pakistan could not afford to let Kashmir slip out of its grip. However, 
Islamabad knew it well that a full-blown conventional war with India 
would never be in the former’s interest. Even with both countries having 
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nuclear weapons, the odds are heavily in India’s favour. With regard to 
the nuclear question, Pakistan’s top-level military leadership believes it 
to be futile to indulge in a nuclear misadventure.14 The reason being, 
after Pakistan’s strike, India would be left with many cities; however, 
Pakistan will be faced with disproportionate retaliation as per India’s 
nuclear doctrine, resulting in Pakistan’s complete annihilation. Hence, 
a proxy war against India continues to remain the best bet given India’s 
limitations in launching a full-fledged military offensive. 
Even though, after 2014, the Modi government has given clear 
indications of an aggressive force posture and heavy retaliation through 
Uri surgical strike (2016) and Balakot air-strike (2019) after the Uri 
fedayeen attack and Pulwama suicide-bombing; respectively, it has not 
deterred Pakistan from abetting terror in India. It is so becau e Pakistan 
knows that India cannot respond to every terror attack with an air strike 
inside its territory. Anything above that is likely to escalate into a full-
blown war involving other powers like China, the US and Turkey. India 
is least likely to precipitate such a scenario. Hence, proxy war remains a 
time-tested and most effective strategy; however, it had to be revitalised 
and improvised because India’s rigorous communication and security 
lockdown made it extremely difficult for the HM, and the Hurriyat 
Conference, the local non-violent separatist group working under the 
firm grip of ISI, to organise terror attacks and civilian protests on a large 
scale. Such a realisation unleashed a significant change in the strategy and 
tactics of a proxy war.
The change was initially evident when ISI threatened to choke HM’s 
finances and weapons’ supplies when UJC led by Syed Salahuddin failed to 
organise widespread protests and terror strikes in Kashmir. The ISI gives 
Rs 3 crore to HM each season for operational expenses.15 The prospects 
of losing such a hefty funding source were undoubtedly a setback for Syed 
Salahuddin and his HM.16 The rift widened after the encounter death of 
Riyaz Naikoo in May 2020, Salahuddin’s deputy and HM commander 












in Kashmir, who was eluding the security forces for the last five years. In 
his funeral prayer rallies in PoK, Salahuddin said that Indian forces had 
the upper hand in Kashmir. Reportedly, he even ranted against ISI in his 
public speech during the funeral prayer; however, its recording is not 
available for reasons more than obvious. 
As a result, ISI’s Kashmir desk began prioritising foreign terrorist 
groups like LeT and JeM and sidelining Salahuddin from its core 
meetings convened to chart out the strategy for militancy in post-370 
Kashmir. Reportedly, in some meetings, there were heated arguments 
between Salahuddin and his ISI-handlers. Finally, the story ended with 
the cylinder blast outside his residence. To which, the message was clear 
•	 The local groups like HM are redundant for ISI because they failed 
to deliver after Article 370. 
•	 The tone and tenor of the proxy war would undergo massive changes.
A Brief Overview of Pakistan’s New Strategy
In the new strategy, foreign terrorist groups such as LeT and JeM are the 
pillars of militancy in Kashmir. For all the operational aspects, they will be 
the primary force. These groups are much better trained and disciplined 
vis-à-vis the HM cadres. They are under the firm control of the ISI as 
their leadership and cadres are mostly from Pakistan. ISI has always 
reposed higher trust levels in the foreign terrorist groups mentioned 
above vis-à-vis Kashmiri terrorist groups such as the Jammu Kashmir 
Liberation Front and HM. In 2003, when the Indian Kashmir-based HM 
commander Majid Dar dared to challenge the ISI-backed Salahuddin,17 
he was killed by unidentified gunmen, allegedly at the behest of ISI.18
With the US all set to leave Afghanistan, there is a strong likelihood of 
Taliban and IS-KP (Islamic State of Khorasan Province) fighters joining 
ISI’s Kashmir-centric terrorist groups. LeT has strong ties with the 
Haqqani network, and both have conducted many joint terror operations 
in Afghanistan.19 In the past, LeT also trained foreign fighters from the 
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United States, Chechnya, and many European countries, joining Al 
Qaeda.20 Most recently, Afghan Security Forces (NDS) arrested Aslam 
Farooqui, the IS-KP chief and the mastermind of the attack on the Sikh 
gurudwara in Kabul, killing 27 civilians (March 2020).21 Interestingly, the 
NDS interrogations revealed that Farookhi was a former LeT cadre and 
had strong connections with the ISI.22 The other outfit, JeM,23 believes in 
the hardline Deobandi Islam to which the Taliban subscribes.24 Recently, 
in a raid at Taliban training camp in Nangarhar, NDS killed ten JeM 
cadres, clearly bringing forth the ties between them.25 
Reportedly, in the February 2020 meeting at Lakhwi’s (Lakhwi is 
the deputy of the UN proscribed terrorist Hafiz Saed (carries a bounty of 
US$ ten million) in LeT and an alleged mastermind of Mumbai attacks 
2008) residence, the ISI’s Kashmir desk officials met all the militant 
commanders.26 Most interestingly, Bakht Zameen, the chief of Al Badr, 
was also invited to the meeting mentioned above.27 Al Badr terrorist 
group was active in Kashmir in the 1990s. However, by the mid-2000s, it 
became defunct in Kashmir. However, it was active in the Af-Pak border 
region, where it developed robust links with the Haqqani group, the 
Taliban’s sword arm. Reviving Al Badr in Kashmir clearly brings forth 
the essence of the new strategy, i.e., strengthening the foreign terrorist 
groups.
Further, as per the information provided by a senior Jammu and 
Kashmir Police official, on the condition of anonymity, the ISI handlers 
did not allow Salahuddin to participate in that meeting.28 In the meeting, 
it was decided to give a big push to the infiltration of terrorists into the 
Indian side of Kashmir and shift cadres from Afghanistan to Kashmir.29 
Reportedly, Pakistan’s intelligence set-up promised all kinds of logistical, 
operational, and financial support for the large-scale infiltration bid. 
The news reports of 450 terrorists (April 2020) waiting in the PoK 
launch pads to enter into Indian Kashmir confirm the implementation 
of the decisions taken in the meeting mentioned above.30 Later, Indian 












intelligence agencies confirmed the interception of Pashto conversations 
in PoK launch-pads, suggesting a substantial likelihood of Pakistan 
shifting jihadist cadres from Afghanistan to Kashmir.31
Notably, the foreign terrorist cadres of LeT and JeM are much better 
trained and skilled than the cadres of the local terrorist groups like HM. 
Also, they have a very extremist outlook and higher levels of religious 
motivation vis-à-vis the local terrorists. It is pertinent to mention that 
JeM executed some of the most lethal fidayeen attacks in India, such as 
the most recent Pulwama suicide bombing (February 2019), in which 
42 soldiers died, and India and Pakistan came on the verge of a full-
blown war. Before that, Jaish also conducted deadly fidayeen attacks in 
Uri, Pathankot, and the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, which 
also brought the two nations very close to war. Jaish’s processor Harkat-
ul-Mujahidin was responsible for hijacking the Indian airliner IC-814.32 
In return, India released three terrorists, one of which Maulana Masood 
Azhar went on to lead JeM and continues to give nightmares to Indian 
security forces. Similarly, LeT has also perpetrated some of the deadliest 
terror attacks, including the Mumbai attacks in 2008, resulting into the 
death of 166 people, which included many Americans.
Changes in Tactical Matters to Avoid the FATF Scrutiny and 
Optimisation of Resources 
•	 Pakistan is creating front organisations, as Pakistan’s ties with LeT, 
JeM and Al Badr are an open secret. As a result, LeT and JeM have 
faded into the background, and most of the terrorist attacks have 
been claimed by the front organisations. 
•	 They are deliberately given secular names to portray them as 
local and homegrown militant groups against the abrogation of 
Article 370 to dominate the global propaganda theatre in the war 
of narratives. Pakistan also intends to convincingly appeal to the 
international human rights and advocacy groups by secularising the 
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names of the new groups. The idea is to project a secular image of 
the Islamist separatist movement in Kashmir to derive credibility in 
global forums. 
•	 It can be reasonably argued that Pakistan is sidelining the local 
groups like HM. However, it does not imply that Pakistan is 
refraining from recruiting local cadres. In fact, the new entities 
with secular sounding names like TRF and Jammu and Kashmir 
Pir Panjal Peace Forum have been created with the purpose of 
expanding the recruitment base, attracting more and more local 
boys. However, the leadership and decision-making powers will be 
vested with foreign terrorist groups. 
•	 These groups make excellent social media use to assert their presence, 
motivate youth to join them, sustain and strengthen resentment as 
a dominant narrative and run psy-ops to demoralise the security 
forces. This is a part of Pakistan’s larger information warfare against 
India (outlined in Pakistan’s 2020 Green Book), to keep the global 
attention focused on Indian Kashmir and to severely dent India’s 
goodwill and development efforts in Kashmir with fake videos, twitter 
posts, thereby incite the local population into unrest.33
•	 They have bypassed the communication lockdown by using VPN 
(Virtual Private Networks) systems, using telecom companies’ private 
networks. Reportedly, some FTs also carried Satsleeve devices which 
can convert a normal mobile phone into a satellite-based internet 
phone.34 Militant cadres use customised and highly advanced 
encrypted communication apps, mostly coming from Pakistan and 
Turkey. Initially, they were using the Russian application Telegram, 
trusted for its privacy features. Later, Turkish apps such as BiP provided 
a reliable channel as its servers are in Turkey, a friendly nation. They 
also use Conion, a TOR (The Onion Router) based application.35 
In TOR-based applications, a small group of three to four people 
can develop their servers, making it extremely challenging to break 












into their systems. Apart from these, there are many customised and 
advanced applications developed by ISI’s cyber experts. It is not easy 
to detect them because they are not even on Google Play Store. Skype 
and Calculator are two examples of such encrypted communication 
applications. Skype has the advantage of working on VoIP (Voice 
over Internet Protocol), enabling the user to make regular calls to 
landline numbers or mobile numbers.36
•	 They have specifically targeted non-local labourers, truck drivers, 
traders, and those who are getting domicile certificates to create 
an impression that the resistance is against the end of special status 
and plans of altering the demography of the region. However, the 
underlying objectives are to build a massive popular resistance against 
the abrogation of Article 370 by getting the sympathies of a larger 
audience, including relatively secular and liberal-minded individuals 
who would not have come strongly in support of a purely religious 
objective, and strengthen the narrative of Kashmir militancy being a 
local and homegrown resistance, in the international narrative and 
propaganda domains. 
•	 In the new strategy, the militants joining the terrorist groups are not 
uploading their pictures on social media, which was a practice before 
5 August 2019. This is to keep themselves off the radar of SFs and 
hinder intelligence gathering on them. Further, the purpose is to 
tire and frustrate the SFs by projecting the m litancy as leaderless, 
structure-less, and spontaneous. Also, running militancy through 
such hybrid, vague, and scattered terror outfits creates smokescreens 
that hamper the intelligence gathering. 
•	 In the terror attacks, the new outfits have focused on killing security 
forces personnel, including senior officers, which is damaging for 
the morale of SFs. Lately, the militants have conducted many terror 
attacks in Srinagar city, some even close to VVIP areas, during foreign 
diplomats’ visit. Such audacious attacks demonstrate their capabilities, 
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intelligence penetration, and competence and also demoralise the 
SFs. They also serve the purpose of conveying to the international 
community that India’s claims of restoring normalcy and peace in 
Kashmir are hollow. 
•	 The nature of attacks, combat skills, and marksmanship displayed by 
terrorist cadres belonging to these front organisations suggest that they 
have highly trained foreign terrorists from Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
In one of the attacks on the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 
camp, the militants took an accurate headshot, and in the Handwara 
(February 2020) encounter, officers of the rank of Colonel and Major 
were killed. Such expertise comes only after rigorous training, under 
the supervision of the Pak army’s Special Forces. 
•	 Besides, in some of the encounters in 2020, advanced weaponry 
has been recovered. In one of the recent encounters in the Kulgam 
district of South Kashmir, the police recovered a Pika machine gun., 
a significant departure from the past.37 In Kashmir, mostly terrorists 
have been using AK 47 rifles, Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs), Chinese 
pistols, and Pakistan’s Shaheen pistol. The militant groups have been 
found with armour piercing bullets.38 Also, the presence of trained 
snipers cannot be ruled out. 
The Resistance Front—A New Wing of LeT
Some of the prominent front/virtual terrorist groups include The 
Resistance Front, People’s Anti-Fascist Front, Jammu and Kashmir 
Pirpanjal Peace Forum, Lashkar-i-Mustapha, Kashmir Tigers, and Muslim 
Janbaz Force.39 TRF has emerged as the most active and lethal terrorist 
outfit after 370. Reportedly, it is a front of LeT; however, its cadres have 
also come from HM and JeM. According to Indian intelligence sources, 
it is controlled by three LeT handlers Sajad Jat for North Kashmir, Khalid 
for Central Kashmir and Hanzala Adnan for South Kashmir.40 It has 
claimed some of the deadliest terrorist acts. With a commanding presence 












on social media, it creates smokescreens by claiming responsibility for 
terror attacks. It maintains an excellent outreach through its audio and 
video communications and pamphlets. 
The incidents that the TRF claims are as follows: 
•	 In 19 October, five labourers from West Bengal were killed.41 The 
attack coincided with European delegates’ visit, for the desired 
messaging, i.e., to convey to foreigners that Kashmir is far from 
normalcy.42 No group ever officially claimed it. On the condition of 
anonymity, the local officers told the author during his field research 
that JeM was behind the killings. However, TRF targeting of non-
locals suggests a substantial likelihood of TRF being involved in it.
•	 In the same month, four non-local truck drivers were killed, and a 
trader from Punjab was killed.43 
•	 In February 2020, TRF claimed to have exploded a grenade in the 
high-profile Lal Chowk area.44 It also claimed the encounter of SFs 
in Handwara-Colonel Ashutosh Sharma (CO 21 RR) and a Major 
martyred. However, Jammu and Kashmir Police (JKP) refuted their 
claims and stated that it is an offshoot of LeT. Further, JKP said that 
one of the militants killed was Haidar, a Pakistani national and the 
commander of LeT in Kashmir.45 
•	 In April 2020, TRF’s name featured in the five-day-long Keran 
encounter (Operation Rangdouri Behak) in which five soldiers 
martyred.46 Three of the slain militants were locals who were missing 
since 2018 and had travelled to Pakistan on a valid visa through the 
Wagah-Attari route for weapons training, proving that TRF is not as 
local as it claims to be.47 
•	 In May 2020, in Wangam (Kupwara) attack in which three CRPF 
personnel died. Reportedly, the assailants were foreign terrorists and 
highly trained in handling weapons as they took headshots.48 
•	 In July and October 2020, the assassination of nine Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) workers. Of which, three workers were killed 
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in Qazigund (Kulgam), BDC Chairman Bhupinder Singh and BJP 
District President, Abdul Hamid Nazar in Budgam, Sarpanch, 
Sajjad Ahmad Khandey in Qazigund (Kulgam) and BJP state 
executive president, Wasim Bari and two of his family members in 
Bandipura.49
•	 In January 2021, TRF claimed to have killed a non-local jeweller in 
Srinagar who had acquired a domicile certificate.50 
Lashkar-i-Mustapha is a front for JeM. Its chief Hidayatullah Malik 
was arrested in Jammu’s Kunjwani area with a grenade and a pistol.51 He 
also conducted in India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval’s 
office in New Delhi, as per JKP.52 His arrest from Jammu makes a strong 
case for the organization being JeM’s front as JeM cadres frequently use 
the Jammu-Punjab border for infiltration, which Pulwama investigations 
finding already confirmed. 
Further, on the Pulwama suicide bombing’s second anniversary, 6.5 
kg of IED was also recovered from the Jammu bus stand.53 JKP arrested 
Suhail Bashir Shah of Pulwama, who disclosed in the police interrogation 
that he received instructions from Pakistan’s Al Badr to plant the IED at 
the Jammu bus stand.54 Maulvi Altaf, the chief of the newly formed group 
Kashmir Tigers, was apprehended from Anantnag (Kashmir).55 He was 
earlier a member of JeM, which brings forth JeM’s another offshoot, i.e., 
Kashmir Tigers.56 
Another front group, Muslim Janbaaz Force, claimed the most 
recent attack (17 January 2021) on a son of a restaurant owner (Krishna 
Dhaba), in Srinagar, in the vicinity of highly secure zones like Gupkar 
Road and the residence of the High Court Chief Justice. After the attack, 
they claimed its responsibility in a letter on the internet in which they 
warned non-locals against obtaining the domicile certificate. The attack 
coincided with the visit of European diplomats in Kashmir.57












Emerging Scenario: What to Expect?
In this perspective, the future trends in Kashmir can be assessed in the 
following ways:
•	 In none of the cases, the parent organisations, that is, the JeM and 
LeT, claimed any link with the offshoots. It is a deliberate strategy 
to create smokescreens of scattered, dispersed and leaderless, and 
unstructured militancy. In the future, this trend will continue. The 
local groups like HM will continue to survive, but only to maintain 
the façade of honouring local sentiments and strengthen popular 
support.
•	 After the ban on Jamaat-i-Islami (February 2019), initially, 
Jamaat cadres hibernated in rural areas. However, over the last 
six to seven months, they have significantly revived their activities 
through clandestine religious congregations and meetings. Jamaat’s 
activities have picked up the pace in Shopian, Pulwama, and 
Srinagar downtown. However, the current strategy is to multiply 
the numbers and strengthen the social base and refrain from overt 
display of religious symbols to elude the intelligence agencies and 
political activities. However, such grassroots-level mobilisation work 
can prepare a fertile ground for revitalising the support system for 
terrorist groups and organising massive social unrest in the future at 
the opportune moment.
•	 Between 2018 and 2020 (up till December 2020), there was an 
increase of 22 per cent in recruitment into terrorist organisations, 
which implies that Pakistan’s strategy to sustain the anti-India 
resentment and increase the number of local terrorists has been 
relatively successful.58 Besides, in the post-370 period, there was a 
massive infiltration of FTs. Though there is no precise data about 
the action numbers, broad estimates from the author’s expert 
interlocutors put the figure between 500 to 600.59 In 2019, out 
of the total 152 terrorists killed, 32 were FTs, and in 2020, out of 
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the total 203 terrorists killed, 37 were FTs, which implies that a 
significant number of them are safely sheltered in Kashmir and other 
parts of India.60 Some of the recent attacks have taken place in safe 
and militarised zones of Srinagar, which amply suggests that militants 
have made a firm base in Srinagar city. 
•	 Given the robust presence of foreign terrorists, in the future, Kashmir 
will witness more Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks on the 
convoys of SFs, fidayeen attacks on civilians and military installations, 
and killings of non-Kashmiri Indians. The terrorist groups will also 
target the Kashmiri police and administrative officers who were at the 
forefront in supporting the government on the Article 370 issue and 
efficiently maintaining law and order and managing the administration 
after August 2019.61 
•	 Despite that ISI-controlled FT organisations like LeT, JeM, and Al 
Badr have emerged as the principal actors in Kashmir theatre, the 
local militants will continue to form a sizable chunk of terrorist 
groups. The Transnational Terrorist Groups (TTGs) like Al Qaeda 
and ISIS have made forays in Kashmir. However, they will function 
under the overall leadership and protection of ISI. They will not 
be able to go against Pakistan and occupy the mainstream space in 
militancy. Hence, militancy is less likely to go Iraq-Syria way even 
though the state has gone through intense Jihadi radicalisation. It 
merits a mention here that Kashmir’s syncretic and moderate Islamic 
roots are a strong barrier against entities like the Taliban, Al Qaeda, 
and ISIS in no small measure. Hence, Kashmir is less likely to witness 
suicide bombings on a large scale, with local boys volunteering for 
fidayeen missions. Lastly, India’s SFs are professional, trained and 
firm, and have a robust intelligence network; hence militancy will 
never dominate the socio-political space.
•	 After the US withdrawal, Pakistan is likely to shift the launch-pads 
and training camps of terrorist groups to Afghanistan, which will give 












Pakistan plausible deniability in the event of a major terror attack 
in India. JeM cadres’ interception at a Taliban training camp in 
Nangarhar (April 2020) confirms that Pakistan has already started 
training a part of its Kashmir-centric terrorist cadres in Afghanistan.62
•	 After 5 August 2019, Turkey and Pakistan have done a massive 
propaganda exercise to sustain and strengthen anti-India resentment, 
anger, and hatred. In the international forums, Imran Khan and 
RT Erdogan launched a tirade against India. In Kashmir, they have 
tried to project the abrogation of Article 370 on the lines of the 
alleged election rigging of 1987 and build a resistance narrative 
around it through provocative videos, songs, rap songs, soaps, and 
media coverage in Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) world.63 
They are available on google and youtube.64 The main themes in 
the propaganda videos and literature are anti-India.65 However, 
they are a concoction of lies, deceit, and exaggeration. They have 
provoking lyrics motivating people to fight for ‘Azadi’. The videos 
depict ordinary people as victims with pellet gun injuries on their 
faces and the Indian security forces as brutal violators of human 
rights. In TRT world reports, communication lockdown and security 
lockdown issues were blown out of proportion, cleverly sidelining 
the aspect of jihadist radicalisation, which in the first place was the 
reason to resort to such strict security measures. They often fabricate 
the actual incident. In one of the videos, they sh wed a child sitting 
on his father’s dead body, with soldiers marching in uniforms.66 In 
the actual incident, the father died in the cross-firing between the 
SFs and militants, reportedly at the hands of the militants because 
the SFs follow detailed protocols of not harming the civilians. They 
have also shown ordinary people, including the females, being beaten 
ruthlessly with clubs and civilians being fired upon in other videos.67
Further, Turkish videos have a distinct trait of featuring Kashmir and 
Palestine to equate them and internalise the Kashmir issue.68 They are 
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in Turkish and Urdu so that they appeal to Turkish-speaking people 
across the globe. The idea is to seek sympathy from across the globe, 
from the governments, human rights activists, and intellectuals, by 
painting Kashmir militancy as a secular struggle against a ruthless 
dictatorship. Such biased videos and rap songs are poisoning young 
minds in a major way. Through the human rights plank, Pakistan 
and Turkey are luring young minds who are relatively secular and 
moderate. Further, TRT world pays Rs 20,000 (US$ 280) to 
Kashmir-based freelance writers for their one-sided news stories and 
opinion pieces, made to look objective and credible.69 
Turkish serial “Diliris Erutgrul” became a massive hit in Kashmir. 
It was widely watched during the Corona pandemic and 
communication and security lockdown post-August 5, 2019.70 Its 
theme of glorifying Muslims’ Ottoman history coincided with the 
security and communication clampdown in Kashmir, which local 
people perceived as persecution and humiliation on account of their 
religious identity. After Ertugrul, an average Kashmiri identifies 
himself with Turkey. Many of them want to visit the grave of caliph 
Osman in Turkey. Such a popular sentiment can be the force that 
Pakistan and Turkey can use to orchestrate a massive civil resistance 
in the future. Also, year-and-a-half-long lockdown, internet shut 
down, poor governance, shoddy infrastructure, corruption, 
bureaucratic apathy and arrogance, and political vacuum have 
fuelled the resentment, alienation, and anger against Delhi, further 
strengthening the anti-India narrative.
•	 Given Erdogan’s ties with transnational terrorist groups in the 
Middle East, strengthening ties with Pakistan, and his recent 
activism on Kashmir, Turkey, is likely to train the cadres of Kashmir-
centric terrorist groups and supply them with its sophisticated 
and advanced drone technology. As per the latest intelligence 
reports, terrorist groups will use drones to attacks police posts and 












military installations. Turkey’s sophisticated Byraktar and Anka 
drones proved a great success in Syria71 and, more recently, in 
the Armenia-Azerbaijan war.72 So far, militants groups have been 
using drones for dropping weapons. With the rapid advancements 
in sophistication, there is a possibility of using them for infiltrating 
terrorists across the border. 
•	 Besides, Turkey’s private paramilitary group, SADAT, having 
close ties with Erdogan and known for training jihadis in Syria 
and Libya, is likely to become active in Kashmir. However, there 
is not much evidence of SADAT’s direct involvement in Kashmir, 
except that US-based Ghulam Nabi Fai (a Kashmiri), ISI-lobbyist, 
and the chief of Kashmir American Council is a member of the 
Union of NGOs of Islamic World (IDSB) a front organisation of 
SADAT.73 He has been seen with the SADAT chief, Tanriverdi, 
on various occasions. However, SADAT has robust ties with 
Pakistan’s army and intelligence. SADAT is likely to establish a firm 
footing in Afghanistan, where it can train terrorists of all kinds, 
i.e., Taliban, ISKP, Haqqani Network, and all the Kashmir-centric 
groups. Additionally, SADAT can also train and raise coordinators 
in Kashmir who are experts in mobilising people and organising 
massive social unrest.
Policy Recommendations
Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the policy 
recommendations in detail, at such a critical stage, a few measures (in 
brief) are mentioned below:
•	 Win back the hearts and minds of the local population with outreach, 
political dialogue, good governance, and providing a healing touch. 
•	 India must reinvigorate its efforts to check infiltration by all means 
and continue a harsh crackdown against terrorist groups and jihadist 
organisations.
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•	 Special operations to apprehend and prosecute the dispersed cadres 
and sympathisers of Jamaat-i-Islami, a banned local Islamist group, 
will deprive the foreign terrorists of the local support base, which will 
make it immensely difficult for them to operate. 
•	 India needs a strong and aggressive force posture with Pakistan, i.e., 
to make Pakistan’s transgressions costly. It may lead to more cross-
border surgical strikes and air strikes; however, such an approach runs 
a perennial risk of intentional or unintentional escalation. 
•	  India has to provide a robust counter to Pakistan-Turkey’s propaganda 
war in both international theatres and the local theatre of Kashmir. 
Delhi needs to mobilise global opinion in its favour and exert pressure 
on Pakistan through global forums, advocacy groups, and NGOs. It 
may require considerable efforts in building a favourable narrative on 
Kashmir in global academic, diplomatic and journalistic circles, which 
may be an extremely tough task for Indian politicians, diplomats, and 
security agencies, given the limitations of their resources, priorities, 
skills, and confusions. 
•	 Extending full-fledged diplomatic and moral support to Pakistan’s 
internal insurgent groups like the Baluch separatist movement, Sindh 
agitation, and the Pashtun Tahfuz movement may put Pakistan 
in a discomforting position. India can also consider hosting the 
‘government-in-exile’ of such regional separatist groups of Pakistan.
Conclusion
After India’s abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, Pakistan’s investment 
of three decades received a major setback. Realising that Kashmir, its 
jugular vein, might slip out of its control, Pakistan changed tactics and 
strategy. There is also a rapid rise in the role of international actors in the 
Kashmir theatre. Most prominently, Turkey’s role has direct relevance to 
militancy; however, other powers like Iran, China and Saudi Arabia have 
also developed robust stakes and networks in Kashmir. In addition to the 












state actors, in the future, the global non-state actors will also be active 
in Kashmir.
Further alarming alienation levels among the local populace and the 
government’s anti-Muslim image may make the situation even more 
complex and exacerbate Delhi’s problems. By all measures, it seems India 
is in for challenging times in Kashmir. Hence, India’s Kashmir-specific 
policymaking needs to be mindful of the developments taking place in the 
Kashmir theatre- both internally and externally.
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